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International Trade Agreements and U. S. Procurement Law
Christopher R. Yukins & Allen B. Green
I.

Introduction and Summary
Some of the most difficult issues in U.S. procurement law stem from the nation’s

several centuries of accumulated protectionist measures, and from a patchwork of trade
agreements meant to contain that protectionism. These conflicting measures reflect a pushand-pull in U.S. procurement policy, between those who favor closed procurement markets
and those who favor open competition; the compromises reached between the two camps have
created a Byzantine set of rules and requirements. At the same time, though, this area of law
holds a special promise for the future of procurement, for cross-border agreements currently
offer the readiest means of erasing anti-competitive differences between national rules, by
bringing many nations to a common standard of international best practice.
To make sense of this complex area, this chapter proceeds in three parts.

Part II

reviews the major pieces of protectionist legislation passed by Congress,1 focusing first on the



Christopher Yukins is the Lynn David Research Professor in Government Procurement Law at the George
Washington University Law School, and co-director of the Government Procurement Law Program there. Allen
Green is a partner in the Washington, D.C. offices of Dentons, an international law firm, and the author of
International Government Contract Law (Thomson Reuters, available through Westlaw). Messrs. Green and
Yukins co-teach a seminar on foreign government contracting at George Washington University Law School.
1
This chapter focuses on federal legislation which imposes domestic preferences. For a survey of state and local
measures, see Yuhua Qiao, Khi Thai & Glenn Cummings, State and Local Procurement Preferences: A Survey,
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Buy American Act of 1933; this discussion also references some of the most important
implementing regulations. Part III reviews the most important U.S. trade agreements which
have limited the force of that protectionist legislation, including the World Trade
Organization’s

Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).2

Because barriers to

procurement can also arise from structural factors -- “non-tariff barriers to trade” which, in
practice, may protect domestic vendors -- this part also explains how the trade agreements
mitigate those non-tariff barriers. Finally, Part IV concludes by offering some practical
suggestions for those working in this field, and suggests a possible road ahead for cooperation
in international procurement markets.
II.

Major Protectionist Measures in U.S. Law

In assessing major laws which protect the U.S. federal procurement market, it is worth
noting that this type of protectionism stretches back throughout the history of the United
States.3 Indeed, even Adam Smith (whose free-market arguments helped shape the early
economic policies of the United States) argued for special protections in trade involving
military materiel, because of the national security implications of allowing foreign nations to

9 J. Pub. Proc. 371 (2009); Kingsley S. Osei, The Best of Both Worlds: Reciprocal Preference and Punitive
Retaliation in Public Contracts, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 715 (2011) (reviewing state preferences).
2
Although the current text is formally the Revised Agreement on Government Procurement, it is popularly
referred to as the “Government Procurement Agreement,” or “GPA.” For an introduction to the GPA, with links
to predecessor versions of the agreement, see the World Trade Organization website at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm.
3
Over a century ago, for example, Congress required that dredging in U.S. waters be done only by U.S.-registered
vessels, see The Dredging Act, Ch. 2566, Sec. 1, 34 Stat. 206 (1906) (“A foreign-built dredge shall not, under
penalty of forfeiture, engage in dredging in the United States unless documented as a vessel of the United
States.”); that preference that may have stemmed from the role that dredging played in the country’s early history,
in national defense and economic development, see, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, A Brief History,
http://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/BriefHistoryoftheCorps/ImprovingTransportation.aspx. Today, the
U.S. government still excludes dredging from U.S. free trade agreements, see, e.g., Agreement on Government
Procurement, U.S. Annexes, Annex 6 (“This Agreement does not cover procurement of dredging services.”),
available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_app_agree_e.htm#revisedGPAm, despite massive
changes in the national economy, and despite pressure from the United States’ trading partners to open federal
dredging contracts to foreign competition, see, e.g., Daniel J. Ikenson, A Ports Policy Barnacled With Bad Law,
Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 2015 (noting pressure from European negotiators to open U.S. dredging markets), available
at http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-ports-policy-barnacled-with-bad-law-1438730822.
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control critical supplies.4 As a practical matter, domestic preferences in procurement are
deeply embedded in U.S. politics and law, and, once in place, are difficult to erase.
A.

The Buy American Act

The Buy American Act5 was passed by Congress in 1933 as part of a broader
protectionist reaction to the Great Depression.6 The Act generally requires federal agencies to
purchase only U.S. materials and manufactured goods.7 Under the Act, as implemented in
federal regulations (discussed below), manufactured products made wholly in the United
States, or products from “substantially all” domestic components, are eligible for price
preferences over foreign products.8 The Buy American Act’s preferences turn on the place of
manufacture of the products (or the source of raw materials), and not the nationality of the
contractor. The Buy American Act applies to the federal government’s direct purchases
exceeding the micro-purchase threshold (currently $3,000),9 and applies where a preference is
consistent with the public interest, and the proffered items are reasonable in cost.10 The margin

4

See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Ch. II (1776) (“There seem, however, to be two cases in
which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic
industry. The first is, when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country.”).
5
41 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8305. The core provision of the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 8302, states in relevant
part:
(1) Allowable materials.--Only unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been mined
or produced in the United States, and only manufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been
manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced,
or manufactured in the United States, shall be acquired for public use unless the head of the department
or independent establishment concerned determines their acquisition to be inconsistent with the public
interest or their cost to be unreasonable.
6

Allen B. Green, International Government Contract Law § 2:4, Historical “Buy National” Legislation—The
“Buy American” Act (Thomson Reuters 2015) (available on Westlaw).
7
See generally John R. Luckey, Domestic Content Legislation: The Buy American Act and Complementary Little
Buy American Provisions 2 (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. No. R42501, Sept. 2012), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42501.pdf.
8
See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, Trade Implications of the Buy American Act of 1933 (July 21, 2014),
http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=731.
9
41 U.S.C. § 1902 (definition of micropurchase); 41 U.S.C.§ 8302(A)(2)(C) (Buy American Act exception).
10
The Buy American Act is implemented through FAR Subpart 25.1, discussed infra.
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of preference applicable to U.S. goods is 6 to 12 percent in the civilian agencies,11 and up to
50 percent in Defense Department procurements.12 There are three major statutory exemptions
to the Buy American requirements: (1) for supplies or materials purchased for use outside the
United States; (2) for supplies or materials which are not available in the United States in
commercially reasonable quantities or satisfactory quality; and (3) to purchases under the
micro-purchase threshold (as noted).13
Other important exceptions to the Buy American Act are explained in the implementing
regulations.14 For example, while normally to qualify as “American” under the Act, the cost
of domestic components of a manufactured item must exceed 50 percent of the cost of all
components, under FAR 25.101(a)(2) that requirement has been waived for acquisitions of
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items.15 To qualify as “COTS,” items must be sold in
substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace.16 This special exception from the Buy
American Act’s requirements -- one of the few exceptions extended to COTS items17 -- reduces
compliance costs for commercial vendors selling COTS items to the federal government.
The implementing regulations for the Buy American Act are divided into two subparts.
FAR Subpart 25.1 applies the Buy American Act to supplies, and includes lists of products
that are considered “nonavailable” in the U.S. market, and so are not covered by the Act.18
Subpart 25.1 also exempts information technology that qualifies as “commercial items” from

11

FAR 25.105.
DFARS 225.105.
13
41 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(2).
14
See Allen B. Green, supra note 6, § 2:5, Historical “Buy National” Legislation—The “Buy American” Act—
Requirements of the BAA.
15
This implements the COTS exception under 41 U.S.C. § 1907.
16
See FAR 2.101 (definitions).
17
74 Fed. Reg. 2713 (2009).
18
FAR 25.104.
12
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the Buy American Act.19 Subpart 25.2, which covers construction supplies, extends a similar
exception for commercial-item information technology used on construction projects.20

B.

"Buy American" Requirements Under the Recovery Act

A recurring point of confusion is the “Buy American” provision in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA),21 also known as the Recovery Act. The Recovery
Act, passed in 2009, injected a massive fiscal stimulus into the U.S. economy, which was then
mired in recession.22 Under section 1605 of the Recovery Act, a domestic content requirement
was attached to all Recovery Act funds, not only for federal agencies but also for other entities
using those funds. Specifically, section 1605 of the Recovery Act prohibited use of funds
appropriated or otherwise made available by the act unless all of the iron, steel, and
manufactured goods used in the project were produced in the United States. Although the
Recovery Act requirement was not part of the original Buy American Act, discussed above,
section 1605 (to the confusion of many) referred to this as a “Buy American” requirement.
Subpart 25.6 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation implemented section 1605 for
federal procurement carried out using Recovery Act funds, and the Office of Management and
Budget separately published guidance23 for grantees’ use of Recovery Act funds.

The

Recovery Act’s “Buy American” provision was controversial,24 in part because section 1605’s

19

FAR 25.103(e).
FAR 25.202(a)(4).
21
Pub. L. No. 111-5.
22
See generally John R. Luckey, supra note 7, at 16.
23
2 C.F.R. § 176.60 et seq.
24
See generally Kameron Hillstrom, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: A Fitting Future for Recovery
Legislation, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 285 (2015); Steven L. Briggerman, Buy American Requirements Under the
Recovery Act: The Final Rules, 25 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 1 (2011); Thomas D. Blanford, Navigating the Recovery
Act's Buy American Rule in State and Local Government Construction, Procurement Law. 3 (Fall 2010); Steven
L. Schooner & Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: Tempering “Buy American” in the Recovery Act -Steering Clear of a Trade War, 51 Gov. Cont. ¶ 78 (Thomson Reuters, Mar. 11, 2009).
20

5

domestic content requirements had the practical effect of slowing projects -- despite the Act’s
stated goal of providing a quick fiscal stimulus to the U.S. economy.25
C.

Other Protectionist U.S. Legislation

Congress has also imposed a number of “Buy America” requirements on procurements
done under certain forms of federal funding, often in transportation programs.26 Some of the
more prominent include:


Projects Funded by the Federal Transit Administration and the Federal
Highway Administration: The steel, iron, and manufactured goods used in all
Federal Transit Administration-funded projects must be produced in the United
States.27 The legislation allows for limited waivers, if for example the use of
domestic materials will drive up the cost of a project by 25 percent or more.
The legislation also imposes automatic debarment on anyone who intentionally
misrepresents that a product purchased with funds under the act was “Made in
America.”28 The federal Department of Transportation is explicitly barred from
limiting states’ ability to impose even more stringent requirements on foreign

25

See, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office, Recovery Act: Project Selection and Starts Are Influenced
by Certain Federal Requirements and Other Factors, GAO-10-383 (Feb. 2010).
26

Many of these special legislative provisions imposing domestic preferences are discussed in John Luckey, supra
note 7, at 2-8. See also Jean Heilman Grier, Federal Domestic Content Restrictions on State & Local Projects
(2014), available at http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=2594. The political aspects of these “Buy America”
requirements are suggested in the Department of Transportation’s description, on its website, at
https://www.transportation.gov/highlights/buyamerica:
The Department of Transportation is committed to maximizing the economic benefits of the Obama
Administration’s historic infrastructure investments through Buy America provisions that keep
American companies healthy and families working.
Buy America provisions ensure that transportation infrastructure projects are built with American-made
products. That means that Department of Transportation investments are able to support an entire supply
chain of American companies and their employees.
27
28

49 U.S.C. § 5323(j).
Id.
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goods and materials used in FTA-funded projects.29 Similar restrictions apply
to projects funded by the Federal Highway Administration.30


Amtrak Rail Projects: The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, which
operates the national passenger rail system doing business as Amtrak, is subject
to a federal statute which requires that Amtrak buy raw materials mined or
produced in the United States, or manufactured articles, material, and supplies
manufactured in the United States substantially from articles, material, and
supplies mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States.31 Again,
limited waivers are available, such as where the use of domestic materials
would be unreasonably costly.32



Intercity Rail Projects -- Federal Railroad Administration: Under law, the
Secretary of Transportation may fund intercity rail projects only if the steel,
iron, and manufactured goods used in the project are produced in the United
States.33 The statutory provisions allow limited waivers, much like those
discussed above regarding other transportation funding legislation.34



Projects Funded by the Federal Aviation Administration: For some projects
funded by the FAA, only steel and manufactured goods produced in the United
States may be used.35 Moreover, the FAA may shift certain contracts to a

29

Id.
23 U.S.C. § 313.
31
49 U.S.C. § 24305(f).
32
Id.
33
49 U.S. § 24405.
34
Id.
35
49 U.S.C. § 50101. The FAA’s “Buy America” requirements are discussed at a website sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Transportation, https://www.transportation.gov/highlights/buyamerica.
30
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domestic firm if the FAA Administrator, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and
the U.S. Trade Representative concur that doing so is in the public interest.36
Finally, Congress has imposed additional special domestic content requirements for
particular kinds of purchases, ranging from photovoltaic devices to goods purchased for
disaster relief.37 For example, under legislation popularly known as the Berry Amendment,
the Department of Defense and specific units of the Department of Homeland Defense are
barred from buying textiles, clothing and certain other materials from abroad.38 Another,
related prohibition applies to foreign “specialty metals,” which may not be used for certain
important categories of items (such as tanks, weapons systems or aircraft) purchased by the
Defense Department, unless certain exceptions apply.39
The discussion above cannot, of course, cover all domestic preferences in federal
procurement. Instead, the discussion is meant to show the diversity of domestic preferences
that have been incorporated into federal law over the years, and to highlight some of the most
important (or well known) among those. While many of these preferences have been preserved
through special exceptions to international trade agreements (discussed infra), the sheer
number and importance of the preferences help explain the key liberalizing legislation (the
Trade Agreements Act) and trade agreements discussed below.
D.

The Trade Agreements Act

36

49 U.S.C. § 50103.
See generally John Luckey, supra note 7, at 6-8.
38
See Allen B. Green, supra note 6, § 2:17, Historical “Buy National” Legislation—The “Buy American” Act—
Manufactured articles—Other U.S. buy national preferences—The Berry Amendment.
39
See Allen B. Green, supra note 6, § 2:18, Historical “Buy National” Legislation—The “Buy American” Act—
Manufactured articles—Other U.S. buy national preferences—Specialty metals statute.
37
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The Trade Agreements Act (TAA)40 implements various free trade agreements that
directly affect procurement.41 Among other things, the TAA authorizes the President to waive
the Buy American Act’s domestic preference for products from countries which have entered
into a trade agreement with which the United States or which otherwise meet certain eligibility
criteria.42 The country of origin under the TAA (unlike the Buy American Act) typically turns
on where the article has been “substantially transformed,” i.e., where it has been transformed
into “a new and different article of commerce, with a name, character, or use distinct from the
original article.”43
The TAA also allows bars purchases from certain nations that have not entered into
trade agreements with the United States (nations that are not “designated”). The President’s
general authority under the Trade Agreements Act to bar procurement from nations that are
not “designated” is addressed at 19 U.S.C. § 2512(a).44 That general bar creates what has been

40

19 U.S.C. chap. 13.
19 U.S.C. § 2502; see, e.g., Steven W. Feldman, Government Contracts Guidebook § 8:33. Trade Agreements
Act (4th ed. 2015); Allen B. Green, supra note 6, § 2:29, The development of international free trade in
government contracts—The U.S. Trade Agreements Act and its implementation.
42
19 U.S.C. § 2511; see, e.g., John A. Howell, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 Versus the Buy American Act:
The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 495, 500 (2006); Allen B. Green, supra
note 6, § 2.39, Interplay between BAA and Trade Agreements Act.
43
FAR 25.001(c) describes the differing tests for determining country of origin under the Buy American Act and
the trade agreements:
41

(c) The test to determine the country of origin for an end product under the Buy American statute (see
the various country “end product” definitions in 25.003) is different from the test to determine the
country of origin for an end product under the trade agreements, or the criteria for the representation on
end products manufactured outside the United States (see 52.225-18).
(1) The Buy American statute uses a two-part test to define a “domestic end product” or
“domestic construction material” (manufactured in the United States and a formula based on
cost of domestic components). The component test has been waived for acquisition of
commercially available off-the-shelf items.
(2) Under the trade agreements, the test to determine country of origin is “substantial
transformation” (i.e., transforming an article into a new and different article of commerce, with
a name, character, or use distinct from the original article). . . .
44

19 U.S.C. § 2512(a) states:
(a) Authority to bar procurement from non-designated countries
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called the “walled garden” of U.S. procurement.45 The “wall” is not an absolute bar, for
vendors from certain least-developed nations46 and Caribbean Basin Initiative nations47
(discussed below) also may sell to the U.S. government, as may vendors selling defense
materiel from “qualifying countries” that have entered into reciprocal defense procurement
agreements with the U.S. Department of Defense (see below).48
Some of the agreements covered by the TAA, discussed further below, are the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and various bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs). With regard to the

(1) In general. Subject to paragraph (2), the President, in order to encourage additional countries to
become parties to the Agreement [on Government Procurement] and to provide appropriate reciprocal
competitive government procurement opportunities to United States products and suppliers of such
products—
(A) shall, with respect to procurement covered by the Agreement, prohibit the procurement . .
. of products—
(i) which are products of a foreign country or instrumentality which is not designated
pursuant to section 2511(b) of this title, and
(ii) which would otherwise be eligible products; and
(B) may, with respect to procurement covered by the Agreement, take such other actions within
the President’s authority as the President deems necessary.
(2) Exception. Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of procurements for which—
(A) there are no offers of products or services of the United States or of eligible products; or
(B) the offers of products or services of the United States or of eligible products are insufficient
to fulfill the requirements of the United States Government.
45

See FAR 25.403(c)(1) (“Under the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2512), in acquisitions covered by the
WTO GPA, acquire only U.S.-made or designated country end products or U.S. or designated country services,
unless offers for such end products or services are either not received or are insufficient to fulfill the requirements.
This purchase restriction does not apply below the WTO GPA threshold for supplies and services, even if the
acquisition is covered by an FTA.”); Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the
Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 529, 569 (2007).
46
FAR 25.404 (“For acquisitions covered by the WTO GPA, least developed country end products, construction
material, and services must be treated as eligible products,” i.e., must be afforded access).
47
FAR 25.405 (“Under the Caribbean Basin Trade Initiative, the United States Trade Representative has
determined that, for acquisitions covered by the WTO GPA, Caribbean Basin country end products, construction
material, and services must be treated as eligible products.”).
48
19 U.S.C. § 2512(b)(3); FAR 25.403(c)(2); DFARS 225.003(1); DFARS 225.403.
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GPA (the most prominent of the trade agreements involving procurement), President Jimmy
Carter delegated his waiver authority to the U.S. Trade Representative under Executive Order
12260,49 and the U.S. Trade Representative has in turn waived the application of the Buy
American Act to procurements covered by the GPA and other free trade agreements.50
The TAA gives the President broad authority to waive “the application of any law,
regulation, procedure, or practice” that could discriminate against suppliers from nations that
are parties to the GPA or the various FTAs. In principle, this authority would appear to cover
any protectionist law or provision (such as those discussed above). In practice, however, the
TAA authority (as delegated) has been much more narrowly applied, to waive only the Buy
American Act and the U.S. Department of Defense’s Balance of Payments Program.51
With regard to socioeconomic preferences, by its terms the TAA authority cannot be
used to waive “any small business or minority preference.”52 Such preferences cover a
significant portion of U.S. federal procurement. Congress has required that federal agencies
award at least 23 percent of all federal procurement dollars to small businesses,53 and because
only U.S.-based businesses can qualify as “small,”54 this small business contracting goal in
effect raises a significant barrier to foreign competition. Because the U.S. cannot waive this

49

46 Fed. Reg. 1653 (Dec. 31, 1980).
See FAR 25.402(a) (“The President has delegated this waiver authority to the U.S. Trade Representative. In
acquisitions covered by the WTO GPA, Free Trade Agreements, or the Israeli Trade Act, the U.S. Trade
Representative has waived the Buy American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products.
Offers of eligible products receive equal consideration with domestic offers.”).
51
See Jean Heilman Grier, Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Broad Authority, Narrow Application (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=559. The Buy American Act is discussed above; the Defense Department’s Balance
of Payments Program, which calls for the purchase of U.S. supplies and construction materials by the Defense
Department abroad, is described at DFARS Subpart 225.75.
52
49 U.S.C. § 2511(f).
53
15 U.S.C. 644(g)(1)(A)(1) (“The Governmentwide goal for participation by small business concerns shall be
established at not less than 23 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year.”).
54
See 13 C.F.R. § 121.105(a)(1) (“a business concern eligible for assistance from SBA as a small business is a
business entity organized for profit, with a place of business located in the United States, and which operates
primarily within the United States or which makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy through payment
of taxes or use of American products, materials or labor.”).
50
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requirement for procurements covered by its trade agreements, it must exclude these small
business preferences from its commitments. In doing so, the United States defines a set-aside
broadly to include any form of preference.55 This reservation for small and disadvantaged
businesses has been explicitly recognized and preserved in the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement, which is discussed in the next Part.
III.

Key International Trade Agreements and Initiatives Regarding Procurement
As noted, the most prominent of the trade agreements which affect federal procurement

is the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, commonly referred to as the
“Government Procurement Agreement” or the “GPA.”56 The discussion below reviews the
GPA and several other free trade agreements that, as is described below, are now reflected in
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
For those working in U.S. federal procurement, the implementing statutes and the terms
of the FAR (and its agency-specific supplements) are, in practical terms, the most important
measures of the trade agreements’ scope. Although the trade agreements discussed below are
international obligations and so should be read to give effect to their plain meaning,57 and
(absent express congressional language to the contrary) domestic law should not be read to
conflict with those international obligations,58 ultimately contracting and oversight officials
(including the Government Accountability Office (GAO)) are likely to give much more weight

55

WTO Revised GPA, U.S. Annex 7 (General Notes), para. 1 (“This Agreement does not apply to any set aside
on behalf of a small- or minority-owned business. A set-aside may include any form of preference, such as the
exclusive right to provide a good or service, or any price preference.”).
56
See generally Allen B. Green, supra note 6, § 2:33. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Government
Procurement Agreement.
57
United Tech. Corp. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The terms of a treaty are to be
given their ordinary meaning in the context of the treaty, and are to be interpreted to best fulfill the purpose of the
treaty. . . . This general rule of construction also applies to international agreements, for which we will more
strictly construe the agreement's plain meaning.”).
58
E.g., Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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to the federal statutes and regulations.59 Thus, while individual trade agreements may reflect
detailed compromises and negotiations, because of the sheer volume of buying in the $500
billion procurement system and the intimidating complexity of the patchwork of agreements,
in any given procurement contracting officials are likely to look first to the terms of the
implementing statutes, regulations and solicitation provisions, and not to the agreements
themselves.

The discussion here therefore focuses on the FAR, which sets forth both

implementing guidance for contracting officials (in Part 25), and implementing clauses for
inclusion in solicitations (in Part 52).
The basic means of implementing the various trade agreements is simple: under
authority of the Trade Agreements Act (discussed above), delegated by the President to the
U.S. Trade Representative, the government waives certain domestic preferences (in the United
States, primarily the Buy American Act) for covered procurements above an agreed monetary
threshold.60 For federal procurements, the acquisition threshold values are set forth in FAR

59

The questions of direct enforcement of international agreements regarding procurement, and of the relative
precedence of international agreements, U.S. statutes and regulations, are generally outside the scope of this
chapter. It is worth highlighting, though, recent bid challenges to the award of a U.S. Air Force contract in
Greenland to the Danish-registered subsidiary of a U.S. company, despite a longstanding U.S.-Danish agreement
that such awards were to be made only to Danish or Greenlandic companies. In its decision denying an initial
protest, GAO focused on the eligibility terms of the Air Force solicitation, which GAO noted were strictly met
by the awardee. Per Aarsleff a/s, Comp. Gen. B-410782 (Feb. 18, 2015). In sustaining a follow-on bid protest
to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Per Aarsleff A/S v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 603, 622 (2015), the court
held that the “treaty bar” of 28 U.S.C. § 1502, which bars the Court of Federal Claims from adjudicating claims
under international treaties and agreements, did not apply because the court was merely using the U.S.-Danish
agreement as a tool in interpreting the terms of the governing solicitation. 121 Fed. Cl. at 622. On appeal of that
decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed on the narrower ground that the solicitation’s
description of eligible contractors was patently ambiguous, and so should have been protested before award. Per
Aarsleff A/S v. United States, Fed. Cir. No. 2015-5111, 2016 WL 3869790 (June 23, 2016).
60
FAR 25. 25.402(a)(1) states:
(a)(1) The Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2501, et seq.) provides the authority for the President to
waive the Buy American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products from countries
that have signed an international trade agreement with the United States, or that meet certain other
criteria, such as being a least developed country. The President has delegated this waiver authority to the
U.S. Trade Representative. In acquisitions covered by the WTO GPA, Free Trade Agreements, or the
Israeli Trade Act, the U.S. Trade Representative has waived the Buy American statute and other
discriminatory provisions for eligible products. Offers of eligible products receive equal consideration
with domestic offers.
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25.402; those thresholds currently range from $25,000 (for supplies from Canada under
NAFTA) to over $10 million (for construction contracts being bid on by firms from Bahrain
and other countries). The FAR sets forth rules for contracting officials calculating the
prospective value of an acquisition. Those rules generally call for a liberal approach to
forecasting the value of an acquisition, and say if “there is any doubt as to the contemplated
term of the contract, use the estimated monthly payment multiplied by 48.”61 The FAR says
that if “recurring or multiple awards for the same type of product or products are anticipated,”
then the contracting official should “use the total estimated value of these projected awards to
determine whether” an agreement applies. “Do not,” the FAR admonishes, “divide any
acquisition with the intent of reducing the estimated value of the acquisition below the dollar
threshold of the WTO GPA or an FTA.”62
While the underlying trade agreements may reflect more nuanced compromises as to
the agencies and categories of goods and services covered, the FAR takes a simpler and more
expansive approach: the FAR does not exclude any executive agency63 from coverage and,
using a “negative list” approach, the FAR excludes only certain narrow categories of services
from coverage.64 The requirements regarding free trade agreements do not, however, apply to
acquisitions set aside for small businesses, or to “arms, ammunition, or war materials, or
purchases indispensable for national security or for national defense purposes.”65 Nor do the
trade agreements apply to acquisitions of end products for resale, acquisitions from Federal

61

FAR 25.403(b)(1)(iv).
FAR 25.403(b)(3).
63
See FAR 1.101 (“The Federal Acquisition Regulations System is established for the codification and publication
of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies.”).
64
FAR 25.401(b).
65
FAR 25.401(a).
62
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Prison Industries, acquisitions from nonprofit agencies employing people who are blind or
severely disabled, or to certain other acquisitions not using full and open competition.66
Similarly, while the underlying trade agreements may include much more detailed
provisions regarding the procedures to be used in procurement (discussed below), the FAR’s
provisions regarding how agencies are to implement the trade agreements are relatively sparse
and simple. FAR 25.402(a)(1) says that offers of “eligible products” -- goods and services
covered by a trade agreement -- are to “receive equal consideration with domestic offers.”67
FAR 25.403(a) echoes that requirement that eligible products “from WTO GPA and FTA
countries are entitled to the nondiscriminatory treatment specified in 25.402(a)(1),” and notes
that the “WTO GPA and FTAs specify procurement procedures designed to ensure fairness,”
citing FAR 25.408.
In turn, FAR 25.408 states that if a trade agreement applies in a particular procurement,
the contracting officer must comply with certain requirements -- requirements, for the most
part, which would apply to federal procurements as a matter of course -- such as publicizing,
response time, currency, language, and notices of opportunities and awards.68

FAR

25.408(a)(3) does go a step further regarding foreign offers, and says that an agency must not
“include technical requirements in solicitations solely to preclude the acquisition of eligible
products” (emphasis added). That provision barring intentionally discriminatory technical
standards is, however, not as broad as Article X of the underlying GPA (discussed below),
which says that a procuring agency “shall not prepare, adopt or apply any technical

66

FAR 25.401(a)(5).
FAR 25.003 states, in relevant part: “’Eligible product’ means a foreign end product, construction material, or
service that, due to applicability of a trade agreement to a particular acquisition, is not subject to discriminatory
treatment.”
68
FAR 25.408(a).
67
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specification . . . with the purpose or the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade” (emphasis added).69
To make better sense of this interplay between the implementing FAR and the
underlying trade agreements, the discussion below reviews the various trade agreements in
more detail. It should be emphasized, however, that U.S. law is not yet settled on what force,
if any, the underlying agreements will be given by U.S. courts and GAO, in a bid protest or
otherwise. What is clear (as discussed below) is that the GPA and the other international trade
agreements are emerging as agreed compilations of international best practices in procurement.
In the long term, therefore, these trade agreements may be integrated more directly into the
fabric of U.S. procurement law and practice, to reduce regulatory barriers to international trade
in procurement.
A.

The World Trade
Procurement (GPA)

Organization’s

Agreement

on

Government

The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)70 is a plurilateral agreement under
the World Trade Organization, which has a main aim of mutually opening member nations’
government procurement markets.71 Membership in the Agreement is open to all WTO
member states, but currently not all WTO members are parties to the Agreement.

Upon

accession by a party, the GPA is a binding international agreement and is enforceable through
a party’s domestic review mechanism (if the GPA is given direct effect) and the WTO’s dispute

69

Available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-94_01_e.htm.
See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwers 2003) (covering the GPA before
the 2012 revision to the GPA); The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (Sue
Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson, eds., Cambridge U. Press 2011) (comprehensive set of essays on the revised
GPA). For a discussion of the most recent revisions to the GPA, in the version which was signed in 2012, see
Robert D. Anderson, Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Feature Comment: The WTO's Revised Government
Procurement Agreement -- An Important Milestone Toward Greater Market Access And Transparency In Global
Public Procurement Markets, 54 Gov't Contr. ¶1 (Jan. 11, 2012). For updates on the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement, see the blog maintained by author Jean Grier at http://trade.djaghe.com/?page_id=310.
71
See World Trade Organization, Agreement on Government Procurement: Parties, Observers and Accessions,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm; Allen B. Green, supra note 6, § 2:35, The World
Trade Organization (WTO)—The WTO Government Procurement Agreement.
70
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settlement mechanism.72 The Agreement comprises two parts: the main text which sets
minimum standards for nondiscriminatory procurement procedures, and the schedules of
commitments for each party’s market access. While the text of the Agreement establishes rules
for “open, fair and transparent” competitive procedures in government procurement, the
schedules of commitments limit the applicability of these rules to only those goods, services
and works, and public bodies, listed in the schedules.
The procedures required by the GPA are important, for as more nations join the GPA,
the GPA’s minima are increasingly becoming the benchmark for procurement rules around the
world.73 Beyond the core requirements under GPA Article IV that parties to the agreement not
discriminate between other parties (“non-discrmination”) and treat vendors from GPA parties
as they would treat their own vendors (“national treatment”), the agreement also sets minimum
requirements for, among other things, publicizing information on a party’s procurement laws

72

Id. Whether the GPA and other free trade agreements (FTAs) are directly enforceable by bid protest brought
in the Unite States, for example by a foreign vendor wishing to challenge an apparently discriminatory provision
of a U.S. solicitation, is an issue that has not been squarely addressed under U.S. law and (as noted) is generally
outside the scope of this chapter; see supra note 59. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted in
Gross v. German Foundation Industrial Initiative, 549 F.3d 605 (3d Cir. 2008), to “ascertain whether an
international agreement creates a private cause of action, we first look to the text of the agreement.” Id. at 612.
The language of the GPA is ambiguous on this point, however, for while it says that each “Party shall provide a
timely, effective, transparent and non-discriminatory administrative or judicial review procedure through which
a supplier may challenge . . . a breach of the Agreement,” the GPA also says that “where the supplier does not
have a right to challenge directly a breach of the Agreement under the domestic law of a Party,” the GPA party
must still allow vendors a forum to challenge “a failure to comply with a Party’s measures implementing this
Agreement.” Whatever the applicable rule in federal procurement, a foreign vendor challenging an allegedly
discriminatory provision might well begin with FAR 25.403(a), discussed above, which says that eligible products
“from WTO GPA and FTA countries are entitled to the nondiscriminatory treatment specified in [FAR]
25.402(a)(1),” and the “WTO GPA and FTAs specify procurement procedures designed to ensure fairness (see
25.408).” The procedures specified by the international agreements are discussed further below; how ultimately
the question of direct enforceability might be resolved under U.S. law is, however, beyond the scope of this
chapter.
73
The model procurement law which was prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), for example, was written to ensure that it conformed where possible to the revised GPA. See
UNCITRAL, Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2014). Similarly, the
procurement provisions in chapter 15 of the currently pending Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement
(discussed below) were based, in large part, on the language of the revised GPA. See Jean Heilman Grier, Revised
GPA as Model for TPP Procurement Rules (Jan. 23, 2014), http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=374.
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and regulations (Article VI), publishing notices of impending procurements (Article VII), time
periods for publicity (Article XI), setting nondiscriminatory conditions for qualifying suppliers
(Articles VIII and IX), nondiscriminatory technical requirements (Art. X), electronic reverse
auctions (Article XIV), disclosing sensitive information (Article XVII), and domestic review
(bid protests) (Article XVIII). It is important to note that Article V of the GPA permits
developing nations to negotiate “differential treatment” from other parties, including more
liberal domestic preferences and offsets; these limited exceptions are intended to entice
developing nations to join the agreement.
The coverage schedules included with the GPA vary by party. The official schedules,
as agreed to by the parties on March 30, 2012, are included in WTO Document No. GPA/113.74
The schedules, set forth in Appendix I to the GPA, are structured uniformly, party by party:








Annex 1 lists covered central government entities.
Annex 2 lists covered sub-central entities (e.g., U.S. states).
Annex 3 lists all other covered entities.
Annex 4 lists the goods covered by the GPA.
Annex 5 lists covered non-construction services.
Annex 6 lists covered construction (works) services.
Annex 7 includes general notes.

For those working in U.S. procurement, certain aspects of the U.S. annexes to the GPA
bear special emphasis. Although Annex 1 covers essentially all U.S. federal agencies, Annex
1 excludes a number of products from coverage; those products, such as textiles and specialty
metals purchased by the Department of Defense, are traceable to special domestic preferences
in U.S. law, or are categories (such as nuclear weapons) protected for national security reasons.

74

Adoption of the Results of the Negotiations Under Article XXIV:7 of the Agreement on Government
Procurement, Following Their Verification and Review, As Required by the Ministerial Decision of 15 December
2011 (GPA/112), Paragraph 5 -- Action Taken by the Parties to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement
at a Formal Meeting of the Committee, At the Level of Geneva Heads of Delegations, on 30 March 2012, WTO
Doc. No. GPA/113 (Apr. 2, 2012), available at www.wto.org. The integrated WTO Government Procurement
Market Access Information Resource (e-GPA) portal -- an online searchable compendium of the schedules,
thresholds and other criteria -- affords ready access to the coverage schedules agreed to by the individual parties,
and is available through https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_app_agree_e.htm.
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The United States’ Annex 2 includes only 37 states, as not all states have joined the GPA. The
missing states, and the uneven coverage among the included states, have been sore points in
ongoing negotiations between the European Union and the United States, discussed below. In
Annexes 4 and 5, the United States has taken a “negative list” approach, i.e., only those goods
and services explicitly excluded by the United States are not covered; the rest of the
procurements by covered agencies are presumptively included, subject to any other special
exceptions. Finally, Annex 7, the General Notes, includes important exceptions, including a
reservation for preferences afforded U.S. small and minority-owned businesses. In practice
this excludes roughly one quarter of U.S. federal procurement from the open market
commitments made under the GPA, because by law federal agencies are to set aside at least 23
percent of federal procurement for small businesses.
Accession to the GPA should give a party’s suppliers enforceable access to other
parties’ government procurement markets, and should improve competitiveness and efficiency
in a party’s government procurement market because GPA lends confidence to prospective
bidders that a GPA member will provide reliable access to its procurement market. Joining
the GPA also demonstrates a nation’s commitment to international best practices in
government procurement.75
B.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a regional trade agreement
between the United States, Canada and Mexico, passed into law in the United States in 1994;76

75

See, e.g., Joshua I. Schwartz, International Protection of Foreign Bidders Under GATT/WTO Law: Plurilateral
Liberalization of Trade in the Public Procurement Sector and Global Propagation of Best Procurement Practices
(draft book chapter), Chapter 3, p. 82.
76
See Christopher R. Yukins, International Protection of Free Trade in Procurement under NAFTA’s Chapter
10 on Public Procurement: The Pathway from NAFTA to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement to a
Potential European-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (draft book chapter, on file with author),
Chapter 4, p. 1.
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it was intended to reduce trading costs, increase business investment, and more broadly help
North America be more competitive in the global marketplace.77 Chapter 10 of NAFTA
contains requirements for each NAFTA party to open up government procurement markets by
way of “non-discriminatory ‘national’ treatment” on “goods and services from suppliers from
the other NAFTA countries.” In order to ensure transparency, effectiveness and fairness in
procurements falling under the agreement, NAFTA contains certain requirements that must be
complied with by each party.
Later trade agreements that address procurement, however, have largely displaced
NAFTA in U.S. law and policy. NAFTA’s procurement-related provisions were never
finalized, and after 1994 the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA) played a much more central role in opening international procurement
markets, both in the United States and in other countries.78 Finally, with the publication in late
2015 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (discussed below), it appeared that NAFTA’s
procurement provisions may be completely supplanted: through side letters, NAFTA members
Canada, the United States and Mexico have agreed that Chapter 10 of NAFTA, on
procurement, will be superseded by TPP’s new protections (discussed below).79
C.

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)

The United States has concluded a number of bilateral and regional Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) which address procurement. Current FTAs which address procurement

77

About News, History of NAFTA, http://useconomy.about.com/od/tradepolicy/p/NAFTA_History.htm, accessed
on 21st December 2015.
78
NAFTA members the United States and Canada are members of the GPA; Mexico, notably, is not.
79
See Jean Heilman Grier, TPP Procurement: Harmonizing FTAs (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=2364.
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include agreements with Chile,80 Singapore,81 Australia,82 Morocco,83 CAFTA-DR84 (covering
certain Central American nations and the Dominican Republic), Bahrain,85 Oman,86 Peru,87
South Korea,88 Colombia,89 Panama,90 and Israel (the earliest of these FTAs).91 These
agreements generally include procurement-related terms which mirror the terms of the GPA.92
Nor is the United States the only nation negotiating such bilateral trade agreements that touch
on procurement: other agreements involving other nations, such as the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union, also
include new provisions intended to open international procurement markets.93

80

See FAR Part 25.400(a)(2)(ii) (referencing United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, as approved by
Congress in the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 108-77) (19 U.S.C. 3805
note)).
81
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(iii) (referencing United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, as approved by
Congress in the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 108-78) (19 U.S.C.
3805 note)).
82
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(iv) (referencing United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, as approved by Congress
in the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 108-286) (19 U.S.C. 3805
note)).
83
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(v) (referencing United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, as approved by Congress
in the United States—Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 108-302) 19 U.S.C. 3805
note)).
84
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(vi) (referencing Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement, as approved by Congress in the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 109-53) (19 U.S.C. 4001 note)). The CAFTA-DR agreement includes
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta.
85
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(vii) (referencing United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, as approved by Congress
in the United States-Bahrain Free Trade agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 109-169) (19 U.S.C. 3805 note)).
86
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(viii) (referencing United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub.
L. 109-283) (19 U.S.C. 3805 note)).
87
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(ix) (referencing United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act
(Pub. L. 110-138) (19 U.S.C. 3805 note)).
88
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(x) (referencing United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub.
L. 112-41) (19 U.S.C. 3805 note)).
89
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(xi) (referencing United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation
Act (Pub. L. 112-42) (19 U.S.C. 3805 note)).
90
See FAR 25.400(a)(2)(xii) (referencing United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation
Act (Pub. L. 112-43) (19 U.S.C. 3805 note)).
91
See FAR 25.400(a)(5) (referencing U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement, as approved by Congress in the
United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 2112 note)); Guy T. Petrillo, Free
Trade Area Agreements and U.S. Trade Policy, 18 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1281 (1986) (discussing U.S.-Israel
agreement).
92
See Scott Sheffler, A Balancing Act: State Participation in Free Trade Agreements with "Sub-Central"
Procurement Obligations, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 713, 719 (2015).
93
See, e.g., Brenda C. Swick, The New European Procurement Directives: A Critical Perspective -- Part II:
Impact of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement on Government Contracting in
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D.

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is multilateral trade agreement between the United
States and other Pacific Rim countries -- Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam -- concluded in October 2015,
which was heading towards possible congressional action as of this writing.94 This agreement
has been called the “cornerstone of the Obama Administration’s economic policy in the Asia
Pacific.”95
Chapter 15 of the TPP is dedicated to government procurement, and establishes
requirements for “transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory rules” of access to each
party’s government procurement markets.96 Much like the other international agreements
discussed above, the TPP parties commit to afford national treatment and non-discrimination
for goods and services from each party, and to comply with certain procedural rules to ensure
open procurement markets. Unlike the GPA, the TPP includes a specific provision, Article
15.18,97 which would encourage parties to exclude corrupt contractors and to address conflicts

Canada, 2014 Gov't Contracts Year in Review Briefs 4 (Thomson Reuters Feb. 2014); Jean Heilman Grier, EU
& Canada: Preparing to Sign Trade Pact (Aug. 9, 2016), http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=3169.
94
See Adam Behsudi, Obama Puts Congress on Notice: TPP Is Coming, Politico, Aug 12, 2016,
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/obama-congress-trade-warning-226952; Office of the United States
Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacificpartnership, accessed on 29th December 2015. The Obama administration’s draft Statement of Administration
Action, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/DRAFT-Statement-of-Administrative-Action.pdf, delivered in August
2016 to signal the start of congressional review, explained (at pages 32-22) that the TPP would preserve existing
environmental and labor/employment protections in procurement.
95
Office of the United States Trade Representative: Executive Office of the President, Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership.
96
Office of the United States Trade Representative: Executive Office of the President, Summary of the TransPacific
Partnership
Agreement,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacificpartnership/tpp-full-text.
97
The TPP article states:
Article 15.18: Ensuring Integrity in Procurement Practices
Each Party shall ensure that criminal or administrative measures exist to address corruption in its
government procurement. These measures may include procedures to render ineligible for participation
in the Party’s procurements, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, suppliers that the Party has
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of interest in procurement. Anti-corruption provisions such as these, which relate only
indirectly to trade, reflect a broadening role for trade agreements: as benchmarks for best
practices in procurement.
E.

Caribbean Basin Initiative

The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is not a trade agreement, but instead a trade
initiative to spur economic development; it remains an important part of relations between the
United States, Central America and the Caribbean nations.98 The main purpose of this initiative
is to promote “economic development and export diversification of the Caribbean Basin
economies.”99 Under the CBI, barriers to the U.S. market -- including the federal procurement
market -- are radically reduced for beneficiary countries.
The CBI is addressed in federal procurement through regulation, at FAR 25.405. Under
that provision, Caribbean Basin country end products, construction material and services for
any type of acquisition that would be covered by the GPA must be treated as “eligible
products,” i.e., cannot be discriminated against by U.S federal purchasers.100
Years after the CBI was put in place, a number of its member nations joined CAFTADR, which as noted is a regional FTA. To reconcile the CBI with the regional free trade
agreement in the Caribbean and Central America, CAFTA-DR, nations which join CAFTADR may no longer be eligible for the benefits of the CBI.101

determined to have engaged in fraudulent or other illegal actions in relation to government procurement
in the Party’s territory. Each Party shall also ensure that it has in place policies and procedures to
eliminate to the extent possible or manage any potential conflict of interest on the part of those engaged
in or having influence over a procurement.
98

Office of the United States Trade Representative: Executive Office of the President, Caribbean Basin Initiative,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi; Francis W.
Foote, The Caribbean Basin Initiative: Development, Implementation and Application of the Rules of Origin and
Related Aspects of Duty-Free Treatment, 19 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 245, 248 (1985).
99
Id.
100
FAR Part 25.405.
101
Id.
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F.

Least Developed Countries

Much as with the Caribbean Basin nations, federal procurement regulations make
special provision for least developed countries, allowing vendors from those nations broad
access to the federal procurement market. Least developed countries are classified by the
United Nations based on three criteria – income, a human assets index (HAI), and an economic
vulnerability index (EVI).102 Specific indicators (such as a per capita gross national income of
less than roughly US$1200) are assessed to determine whether a country qualifies for this
category.103

As of December 2015, 48 countries qualified.104 FAR 25.003 lists the least

developed countries given special treatment by U.S. rules,105 and FAR 25.404 provides that
“[f]or acquisitions covered by the WTO GPA, least developed country end products,
construction material, and services must be treated as eligible products.”
G.

Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements

The market-opening measures discussed above center around the goods and services
covered by the GPA, which for many nations covers primarily civilian goods and services.106
In a separate initiative regarding defense materiel, the U.S. Department of Defense has signed
reciprocal defense procurement agreements, in the form of memoranda of understanding
(MOUs) or international agreements, with its counterpart ministries of defense in several

102

UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries
and Small Island Developing States, Criteria for Identification and Graduation of LDCs,
http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/.
103
Id.
104
See http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf.
105
FAR 25.003 defines “least developed” countries to include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho,
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu,
Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, and Zambia.
106
See Allen B. Green, supra note 6, § 2:40, The consequences of the “Defense Exemption.”
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countries.107 These reciprocal agreements enhance national security by furthering alliancewide security objectives and easing armaments cooperation.108 As is the case for other trade
agreements, these reciprocal defense procurement agreements call for the signatories to act
bilaterally to remove trade barriers regarding defense materiel.109 A nation which enters into
such a reciprocal agreement with the Department of Defense is as a “qualifying country” under
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS),110 and qualifying country
products are afforded the same treatment as domestic products in Defense Department
procurement.111 Under these reciprocal defense agreements, as implemented through the
DFARS, the Department will, among other things, waive the Buy American Act and will work
to ensure that U.S. technical requirements are not unduly restrictive towards supplies from
“qualifying nations”;112 U.S. vendors are to enjoy reciprocal access to counterparts’ defense
markets.
H.

The Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP) -- and the
Road Ahead

At the time of this writing, the United States and the European Union were engaged in
extended negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which

107

See generally Government Accountability Office (GAO), Federal Procurement: International Agreements
Result in Waivers of Some U.S. Domestic Source Restrictions GAO-05-188 (Jan 26, 2005),
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-188; Drew B. Miller, Note, Is It Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense
Procurement Agreements?, 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 93, 96 (2009); Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: The
European Defense Procurement Directive: An American Perspective, 51Gov't Contractor ¶ 383 (Nov. 4, 2009).
108
Allen B. Green, supra note 6, § 2:21, The development of international free trade in government contracts—
United States bilateral defense trade memoranda of understanding.
109
The U.S. reciprocal defense
procurement agreements are posted online at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoranda_of_understanding.html.
110
DFARS 225.003(10). Currently, the qualifying countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. Id.
111
See 252.225-7001, Buy American and Balance of Payments Program (implementing clause).
112
DFARS 225.872-1 and -3.
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is to include a chapter on procurement.113 While there has been heated debate on TTIP (and
other trade agreements) in the 2016 U.S. election cycle, there is a significant chance that TTIP
may, in time, be adopted to create a new free trade area between the United States and Europe.
Although the draft TTIP agreement has not been officially released, a draft of the TTIP
agreement which was leaked by Greenpeace Netherlands114 suggested that TTIP’s government
procurement terms will largely mirror those of the GPA. Early indications are, though, that
the European Union and the United States may go a step farther in TTIP, and establish a forum
for EU-U.S. regulatory cooperation regarding procurement (and other areas) to reduce
regulatory barriers to trade.115 Regulatory cooperation would mark a third means of opening
procurement markets, beyond nondiscrimination commitments and beyond the process
requirements normally included in free trade agreements.
IV.

Closing Observations
As the discussion above reflects, the regulatory scheme in this area is inherently

complex, for international trade rules and procurement regulations do not mesh gracefully.
International trade agreements, which often reflect decades of painful compromise, are far too
ornate to carry easily into a procurement system.

At the same time, constantly evolving

procurement systems are difficult to rationalize by international agreement.
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See generally Jean Heilman Grier, TTIP Procurement Data Debate: Time to Conclude? (July 12, 2016),
http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=3063; Christopher R. Yukins & Hans-Joachim Priess, Feature Comment: Breaking
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Even when an international agreement does resolve a trade barrier in procurement, that
solution may not be readily enforceable under U.S. law. For example, although (as noted)
Article X of the GPA prohibits technical requirements that are either intentionally or in effect
barriers to trade, if that provision has not been incorporated directly into U.S. statutes or
regulations a vendor may not be able to enforce it, either because of a formal bar to
enforcement116 or because of a reluctance on the part of oversight authorities (a court or GAO)
to enforce an international agreement without clear support in U.S. law.
Those pressing to resolve a trade barrier in procurement can, though, take an alternative
route, by looking to traditional notions of maximum practicable competition to fill the
enforcement gap. Under basic principles of procurement law, an agency may not impose a
technical requirement that unreasonably limits competition in a procurement.117 That rule,
which is readily enforceable under U.S. law, may offer an alternative means of opening
competition when (for practical or legal reasons) an international agreement cannot be brought
to bear. That said, because the challenged agency need only proffer a “reasonable” basis for a
restrictive requirement, and because the traditional analysis may not capture the broader
concerns implicated by an international agreement -- the need for harmonized rules across
markets, for example -- relying on domestic rules of open competition may not be enough, in
the long run.
Those challenging barriers to the U.S. procurement market also should recognize the
cultural and legal conflicts (and overlaps) between systems. For example, while there is often
a bias in the U.S. system to “buy national,” that type of economic nationalism emerges in other
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nations, as well. European trade statistics, which show that there is relatively little cross-border
procurement in Europe, 118 suggest that this bias is endemic to procurement, and not a uniquely
“American” phenomenon.

It is also worth noting that while the highest institutions in EU

governance (including the European Commission and the Court of Justice for the European
Union) tend to be the strongest proponents of opening European procurement markets (as part
of a broader effort to integrate Europe), pressure to open the U.S. system to international
competition may instead come from operational managers, such as contracts managers and
program personnel who favor broader competition in order to ensure that the government
purchases best value.
Finally, it is important to understand the basic changes underway in international
agreements regarding procurement. The market-opening rules traditionally developed under
international trade agreements have sometimes proven inadequate, because of the difficulties
in applying and enforcing those rules. As a result, a new approach may gain momentum in the
coming years: a new effort among procurement regulators from different nations to converse
and cooperate, to reduce trade barriers in procurement. By drawing together regulators from
different national procurement systems, this cooperative approach -- which is only now
emerging -- may make efforts to open international procurement markets more practical and
political, more based on common rules grounded in acknowledged best practices, and less legal
and formalistic.
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